

of carrying it to power. In the Dominican case, there is neither the numbers nor the leadership.

I cannot hope that men like Wessin y Wessin, Antonio Imbert, or Jules Dubois will know these things, will think about them, and will act accordingly. But logically I had the right to expect that in Washington there would be someone who would understand the Dominican political scene and the role that the Communists could play in my country. As is evident, I was mistaken. In Washington they know the Dominican problems only as they are told of them by Wessin y Wessin, Antonio Imbert, and Jules Dubois.

The lack of adequate knowledge is tantamount to the nullification of the power of intelligence, above all in politics, and this can only lead to sorry results. When intelligence is canceled, its place is occupied by fear. Today there has spread over the countries of America a fear of communism that is leading us all to kill democracy for fear that democracy is the mask of communism.

It seems to me we have reached the point where we consider democracy incapable of resolving the problems of our peoples. And if we have truly arrived at this point, we have nothing to offer humanity. We are denying our faith, we are destroying the columns of the temple that throughout our life has been our shelter.

Are we really doing this? No, I should not say this. It is the others. Because in spite of everything that has happened, I continue to believe that democracy is the dwelling place of human dignity.

American Airpower in South Vietnam

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. DONALD J. IRWIN

OF CONNECTICUT

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, September 22, 1965

Mr. IRWIN. Mr. Speaker, I wish to call the attention of my colleagues to remarks made this morning by Congressman PIKE, of New York, chairman of the Special Subcommittee on Tactical Air Support of the House Armed Services Committee. Mr. PIKE's well-reasoned statement at the opening of subcommittee hearings on the question of why American airpower has been unable to find and destroy the Vietcong in South Vietnam sets the tone for the hearings. As he said in his statement:

They (the hearings) will not be accompanied by spectacular press releases, nor will any of the issues to which we direct our attention be prejudged. It is our purpose to study, and if we can, to help solve them.

Congressman PIKE's statement follows:

STATEMENT BY HON. OTIS G. PIKE, CHAIRMAN, SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT OF HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, AT OPENING OF HEARINGS, SEPTEMBER 22, 1965

In January 1961, in a report to a Communist Party conference, Chairman Nikita Khrushchev set forth the doctrine by which Communist conquest was to be governed in the future. He described four kinds of war: (1) World wars, (2) local wars, (3) liberation wars, and (4) popular uprisings.

Mr. Khrushchev announced to the world that international communism was opposed to both world wars and local wars as being

too dangerous for profitable utilization in a world armed with nuclear weapons.

With regard to what he referred to as wars of national liberation, however, he stated that the Communist movement would recognize and support such wars. With specific reference to the war in Vietnam, he said: "It is a sacred war."

For 4½ years we have been forewarned. What Khrushchev referred to as wars of national liberation and described as "sacred" in Vietnam have been translated on the battlefield and in the cities and countryside into attacks by terrorists at night, the blowing up of restaurants and buses as well as bridges and barracks. In a jungle environment attacks on government outposts are carried on most frequently by platoon or company-sized units at night. These small units are armed with mortars, recoilless rifles, machineguns, and automatic weapons. They do not have tanks or armored personnel carriers, and they walk into battle. They would be hard to find in a jungle environment in the daytime. They are harder to find during the nighttime, which they claim for their own.

Arrayed against these small and elusive units is the military power of America. We have all the tanks that there are in South Vietnam. We have all the armored personnel carriers that there are in South Vietnam. We have almost all of the artillery, and we retain complete mastery of the skies. Over 20 different models of American aircraft, undisturbed by enemy aircraft, roam the skies of South Vietnam at will, subject only to the danger of ground fire from conventional small arms.

Many voices have been raised asking why our airpower is unable to find and destroy the Vietcong in South Vietnam. Chairman L. MENDEL RIVERS has asked this subcommittee to look into this question. Due to the present pressing congressional obligations of the members and staff of the subcommittee, we will have limited opportunities to travel for the purpose of field investigations until recess of this session of Congress. In addition, the time allotted to the subcommittee is not sufficient to allow us at this time to inquire into every detail related to tactical air support, and therefore we must limit our investigations to the following aspects:

1. The adequacy of our close air support during the course of the war in Vietnam and today;
2. The availability of close air support 24 hours a day under all weather conditions;
3. The quantities available, the cost and effectiveness of the various tactical aircraft being used in South Vietnam today;
4. The adequacy of liaison and communications between the air forces and the ground forces in Vietnam;
5. The adequacy of existing logistic and support facilities for tactical aircraft in Vietnam;
6. The development of new tactics and techniques for close air support;
7. Whether any progress has been made in developing and producing a new type aircraft for close air support in limited war situations;
8. The adequacy of our training environment to simulate conditions such as those found in Vietnam.

For the purpose of the subcommittee during these investigations we have adopted the Joint Chiefs of Staff definition of close air support: "Air action against hostile targets which are in close proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces."

I believe that these hearings have a significance beyond our current confrontation in Vietnam. As we look at the globe we can see over much of its land surface other peoples who must be considered amenable to Communist propaganda, to Communist

subversion, to Communist terror. We see people who remain hungry, who remain ill clothed, ill housed, and uneducated. We can see at the outset that no amount of military power of any kind is the answer to their problems. We would be blind indeed, however, if we could not also see, as we see in Vietnam, that no government can attack and solve these problems when it is the steady victim of armed terror and armed insurrection aimed not at the solution of the people's problems, but at the domination of the people themselves. As we look at the globe we also find countless other areas where not only the economic and social problems are the same as those in Vietnam, but where the geography is the same. We find countless regions where small bands of armed guerrillas can operate effectively in jungles, as the Vietcong do in Vietnam, as Castro did in Cuba, and as is being done on the continents of Africa and South America today.

The question before us is, having been forewarned, have we adequately forewarned ourselves? Have we used too much of our resources in preparing for the kind of warfare which Khrushchev has described as intolerable, and not enough of our resources in preparing for the kind of warfare he described as inevitable?

These hearings will of necessity be held almost exclusively in executive session. They will not be accompanied by spectacular press releases, nor will any of the issues to which we direct our attention be prejudged. It is our purpose to study and, if we can, to help solve them. We are starting our hearings not with the testimony of planners in the Pentagon, who would tell us how our system should work; we are starting our testimony instead with witnesses who have been on the firing line in Vietnam and can tell us how it does work. Today we will hear witnesses who have been on the ground, and who have needed air support; tomorrow we will hear those who have been in the air and have tried to provide it. It is obvious that any weaknesses in our system of close air support have not proved fatal to those whom we will hear from. What others who called for air support and failed to receive it might have testified we can never know. In future sessions we will hear from the men who plan our tactics, procure and manufacture our planes, and train our pilots. We will visit the bases and places where these activities are conducted.

I say to each of the witnesses that before we can help you, you will have to be candid with us. I enjoin each of the witnesses to speak freely and in his own words, to give an account of his personal combat experiences in Vietnam during which close air support was requested. We are particularly interested in your personal evaluation of what happened, or what should have happened.

CHANGE OF RESIDENCE

Senators, Representatives, and Delegates who have changed their residences will please give information thereof to the Government Printing Office, that their addresses may be correctly given in the Record.

RECORD OFFICE AT THE CAPITOL

An office for the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, with Mr. Raymond F. Noyes in charge, is located in room H-112, House wing, where orders will be received for subscriptions to the Record at \$1.50 per month or for single copies at 1 cent for eight pages (minimum charge of 3 cents). Also, orders from Members of Congress to purchase reprints from the Record should be processed through this office.

It was not necessary to be a political genius to realize that if anti-Communist persecution began in the Dominican Republic the police and the military would also persecute the democrats. Neither need one be a political genius to understand that what the country needed was not stimulation of the mad forces of Trujilloism which still existed in the police and the military, but rather the strengthening of democracy by demonstrating to the Dominicans in practice that what was best for them and the country was to live under the legal order of a democratic regime.

Now then, in the Dominican picture there was a force that in my opinion was determining the pointer of the political balance, in terms of ideologies and doctrines, and that force was the June 14th movement.

I have said that according to my calculations there was in the June 14th Movement an infiltration of less than 50 Communists, some of them in executive positions and others at lower levels. But I must state that control of this party, at all levels, was held by an overwhelming majority of young people who were not Communists and some of whom were strongly anti-Communist. How can one explain that there should be Communists together with non-Communists and active anti-Communists? There is one reason: the June 14th Movement was based, in all its breadth and at all its levels, on intense nationalism, and that nationalism was manifested above all in terms of strong anti-Americanism. To convert that anti-norteamericanismo into dominicanismo there was only one way: maintain for a long time a democratic regime with a dynamic and creative sense.

APPETITE FOR POWER

I knew that if the country saw the establishment of a government that was not elected by the people—that was not constitutional and not respectful of civil liberties—the Communists would attribute this new government to U.S. maneuvers. I also knew that in view of the anti-Americanism of the youth of the middle class—especially in the June 14th Movement—Communist influence would increase. The equilibrium of the political balance was, then, in that party. Any sensible Dominican politician realized that. The trouble was that in 1963 the Dominican Republic did not have sensible politicians, or at least not enough of them. The appetites for power held in check for a third of a century overflowed, and the politicians turned to conspiring with Trujillo's military men. The immediate result was the coup of September 1963; the delayed result was the revolution of April 1965.

It is easy to understand why Dominican youth of the middle class was so nationalistic. This youth loved its country, wanted to see it morally and politically clean, hoped for its economic development, and thought—with reason—that it was Trujillo who blocked morality, liberty and development of the country. It is also easy to understand why this nationalism took the form of anti-Americanism. It was simply a feeling of frustration. This youth, which had not been able to get rid of Trujillo, thought that Trujillo was in power because of his support by the United States. For them, the United States and Trujillo were partners, both to be blamed for what was happening in the Dominican Republic, and for that reason their hate for Trujillo was naturally converted into feelings of anti-Americanism.

I am not discussing here whether they were right or wrong; I am simply stating the fact. I know that in the United States there are people who supported Trujillo and others who attacked him. But the young Dominicans knew only the former and not the latter, since Trujillo took care to give the greatest publicity possible to any demonstration of support, however small, that was offered directly or indirectly by a U.S. citi-

zen, whether he was a senator or an ordinary tourist; and on the other hand, he took great pains to prevent even the smallest notice in the Dominican Republic of any attack by an American citizen. Thus, the Dominican youth knew only that Trujillo had defenders in the United States, not that he had enemies.

For his part, Trujillo succeeded in creating with the Dominican people an image of unity between society and government that can only be compared with what has been produced in countries with Communist regimes. For more than 30 years in the Dominican Republic nothing happened—nothing could happen—without an express order from Trujillo. In the minds of Dominican youth this image was generalized, and they thought that in the United States also nothing could happen without an order from whoever governed in Washington. Thus, for them, when an American senator, newspaperman or businessman expressed his support of Trujillo, that person was talking by order of the President of the United States. To this very day, a large number of Dominicans of the middle class think that everything a U.S. citizen says, his Government is saying too.

The pointer of the political balance, as I said earlier, was in the June 14th Movement, which was saturated with anti-Americanisms. This group included the most fervent youths and even those best qualified technically—but not politically—as well as the more numerous nucleus of middle class youth; it also constituted the social sector where Communist sermons could have the most effect and from whence could come the resolute leaders that the Communist lacked. Trujillo had tortured, assassinated and made martyrs of hundreds of members of the June 14th Movement. To persecute these youths was to send them into the arms of communism, to give strength to the arguments of the few Communists that had infiltrated the movement. The Communists said that the democracy that I headed received its orders from Washington, the same as had Trujillo, to destroy the nationalistic youths. Little by little, as the days passed, the non-Communist and anti-Communist members of the June 14th Movement were gaining ground against the Communists, since they were able to prove to their companions that my democratic government neither persecuted them nor took orders from Washington. In 4 years, the democratic but nationalistic sector of the June 14th Movement—which was in the overwhelming majority—would have ended the Communist influence and made itself into a firm support of Dominican democracy.

A CHANGE OF TARGETS

The weakness of the Dominican Communists was also shown by the activity of the Social Christian Party, which presented itself as militantly anti-Communist. It persecuted the Communists everywhere, to the point that they could not show themselves in public. But when the Social Christians realized that the best source of young people in the country was the June 14 Movement, they stopped their street fighting against the Communists and began a campaign against imperialismo norteamericano. When they showed with this battle cry that they were not a pro-United States party, they began to attract young adherents who had been members of the June 14th Movement as well as many others who already had a clear idea of what they wanted to be: nationalists and democrats. Thus, the Social Christian leaders came to understand that the key to the Dominican political future lay in assuring the nationalistic youth of a worthy and constructive democracy.

What the Social Christians learned by 1963 would have been understood by other political groups if the Dominican democracy had been given time. But this was not be. Re-

actionaires in the Dominican Republic and the United States set themselves ferociously against the Dominican democracy under the slogan that my government was "soft" on the Communists.

This is the point at which to analyze weakness and force, if those two terms signify opposite concepts. There are two ways to face problems, particularly political ones. One is to use intelligence and the other is to use force. According to this theory, intelligence is weak, and the use of intelligence, a sign of weakness.

I think that a subject so complex as political feelings and ideas ought to be treated with intelligence. I think also that force is a concept that expresses different values, as can be seen in the United States or in the Dominican Republic. In the United States, the use of force means the application of the law—without crimes, without torture, without medieval barbarism; in the Dominican Republic, it means quite the contrary; one does not apply the law without instruments of torture, not excluding assassination. When a Dominican policeman says of a person that he is a Communist, he is saying that he, the policeman, has the full right to beat him, to shoot him, or to kill him. And since this policeman does not know how to distinguish between a democrat and a Communist, he is quite apt to beat, shoot, and kill a democrat.

It is not easy to change the mentality of the people who become policemen in the Dominican Republic, especially with little time to do it. When the New Englanders burned women as witches, those who did the burning believed absolutely that they were destroying witches. Today, nobody believes that they were witches. But it is still like early Salem in Santo Domingo. When a Dominican policeman is told that he should persecute a young man because he is a Communist, the policeman believes with all his soul that his duty is to kill the youth.

COMMUNIST TAKEOVER?

The problem that my democratic government faced was to choose between the use of intelligence and use of force, while the time passed during which the hotheaded youths and uneducated police learned to distinguish between democracy and communism. And if someone says that in this period the Communists would be able to gain strength and take power, I say and guarantee that they could not do it. Only a dictatorship can give to the Communists the arguments they need for progress in the Dominican Republic; under a democratic regime the democratic conscience would outstrip the Communists.

To return to the concepts of intelligence and force, I think that they apply to communism itself in its fight for the conquest of power. No Communist Party, in no country of the world, has been able to reach power solely because it was strong; it has needed, besides, a leader of exceptional capacity. The Dominican Communists have not had and do not have force, and they have not had and do not have a leader comparable to Lenin, Mao, Tito, or Fidel; and according to my prediction, they are not going to have either the force or the leader in the foreseeable future.

Dominican communism is in its infancy, and began, as did Venezuelan communism, with internal divisions that will require many years to overcome. Only the long dictatorship of Pérez Jiménez was able to create the right atmosphere for the different groups of Communists of the Venezuela of 1945 so that they could come together into a single party, and the lack of a leader of exceptional capacity has, in spite of the power of the party, voided the chance of Venezuelan communism coming to power.

How many Communists did France have? How many Italy? But neither French nor Italian communism ever had leaders capable

S.J. Res. 98. Joint resolution authorizing and requesting the President to extend through 1966 his proclamation of a period to "See the United States," and for other purposes.

ADDRESSES, EDITORIALS, ARTICLES, ETC., PRINTED IN THE APPENDIX

On request, and by unanimous consent, addresses, editorials, articles, etc., were ordered to be printed in the Appendix, as follows:

By Mr. MONRONEY:

Address entitled "America, the Beautiful," delivered by the Honorable Russell E. Train, president of the Conservation Foundation, at the annual meeting of the American Forestry Association, held jointly with the National Council of State Garden Clubs, at Jackson Lake Lodge, Wyo.; which will appear hereafter in the Appendix.

By Mr. METCALF:

Article entitled "From Race of Sorrows to Morning Star," written by Beverley B. Morales and published in the Billings Gazette, in tribute to the St. Labre Mission.

By Mrs. NEUBERGER:

Article entitled "Are Trading Stamps Losing Their Punch?" published in Business Week of September 4, 1965.

By Mr. LAUSCHE:

Constitution Day program of the Canton, Ohio, Kiwanis Club.

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, since the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee [Mr. FULBRIGHT] made a speech on the floor of the Senate last week relative to our operations in the Dominican Republic, many words have been spoken in reference to that speech in the Chamber. However, as might have been expected, the reception given the speech outside the halls of Congress was somewhat warmer than the reception given it by certain Senators.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record at this point an editorial which appeared in the Bennington Banner, of Bennington, Vt., on September 20, entitled "Senator FULBRIGHT'S Unpleasant Truths."

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

SENATOR FULBRIGHT'S UNPLEASANT TRUTHS

It will be surprising if Senator FULBRIGHT's blockbusting statement of last week on U.S. policy in the Dominican Republic doesn't produce a profound chill in his relations with the White House.

Senator FULBRIGHT, to be sure, was careful to blame what he considers gross mis-handling of the Dominican crisis on the President's advisers. Yet it is hardly flattering to President Johnson to say that he was pushed by his subordinates into an unjustified military adventure, and into misrepresenting the facts to the American people.

The burden of the Senate foreign policy chairman's argument is that the marines were sent into Santo Domingo last April not, as the President claimed, to save American lives but to prevent "a return to power of Juan Bosch or of a government controlled by Bosch's party, the Dominican Revolutionary Party."

He contends further that estimates of Communist influence in the revolutionary movement were grossly exaggerated and that

evidence doesn't justify the administration's assertion that the revolution was in danger of being taken over by Communist elements when we intervened.

Senator FULBRIGHT also raised other important questions that our Latin American policymakers would do well to ponder before they advise the President to intervene in another revolution. Most important, Senator FULBRIGHT asks whether the administration's reaction to the Dominican crisis is part of a broader shift in its attitudes toward Latin American countries.

He makes it clear that social revolution is inevitable in Latin America, and that the United States can use its power to influence the choice the Latin Americans make. This choice, more often than not, will be between corrupt military dictatorships and social revolutionary parties.

"Since just about every revolutionary movement is likely to attract Communist support, at least in the beginning," the Senator declared, "the approach followed in the Dominican Republic, if consistently pursued, must inevitably make us the enemy of all revolutions and therefore the ally of all the unpopular and corrupt oligarchies of the hemisphere."

The United States must decide, he suggested, "whether, by supporting reform, we bolster the popular non-Communist left, or whether, by supporting unpopular oligarchies we drive the rising generation of educated and patriotic young Latin Americans to an embittered and hostile form of communism like that of Fidel Castro."

Predictably, the words had hardly left Senator FULBRIGHT's mouth before he was accused of being soft on communism, but these charges in no way detract from the importance of the issues he has raised. Intervention in the affairs of another nation, as the United States often loudly proclaims, is an extreme and not easily justified course of action. The lessons learned in the Dominican Republic should make us think twice before trying it again.

Under normal circumstances, one might perhaps question the propriety of such a frontal attack by the Democratic chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee on the policies of a Democratic president. But the circumstances in this case are not normal, first, because the Republican leadership in Congress is too illiberal to make the point that FULBRIGHT has made, and second, because the issue raised by our Dominican adventure is far too important to be stifled by a senseless consensus.

It can be argued, perhaps, that the Senator does not make sufficient allowances for the political dilemma which the Johnson Administration faced in the Dominican crisis. Obviously the President and his advisers were strongly motivated by a morbid fear of what would happen to the Democrats' political fortunes if they permitted the establishment of "another Cuba." No doubt they reasoned that even in a 1-in-50 chance of a Communist takeover was a risk to be avoided at any cost.

But this is a pretty poor excuse for a decision that aligned us with the enemies of reform, violated our solemn treaty obligations, and rendered our Latin American aims deeply suspect among liberals everywhere. FULBRIGHT is right when he says the Johnson administration should have had the sense and the courage to take the minimal risk entailed in casting our lot with the forces of social justice.

Mr. AIKEN. The Bennington Banner, it may be recalled, won first prize last spring for being the best made up and best established newspaper in the United States, regardless of circulation. I believe the editorial, whether one agrees with all it contains or not, is a fine example of how this small Vermont news-

paper happened to win over all the other publications in the United States, both large and small.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. AIKEN. I yield to the Senator from Pennsylvania.

Mr. CLARK. Is the Senator putting in the Record an editorial about the Dominican situation from a Bennington, Vt., newspaper?

Mr. AIKEN. That is correct. It is a well written editorial, and it relates to the speech which was made by the Senator from Arkansas, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee [Mr. FULBRIGHT], last week.

Mr. CLARK. I have found myself in complete agreement with the editorial, which I thought was very constructive. I wonder if the Senator from Vermont is also in accord.

Mr. AIKEN. I made a few remarks the other day to the effect that while I thought the President was justified in taking some action that night—I think he would probably have been negligent had he not taken some action—I agreed with the Senator from Arkansas that there were a good many unnecessary mistakes made before a temporary government was finally established, primarily by backing the wrong—

Mr. CLARK. Horse?

Mr. AIKEN. The wrong personality to start with, and certain other mistakes which I do not intend to itemize.

Mr. CLARK. I thank my friend from Vermont.

PEACEMAKING IN ASIA

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, the immediate reaction of the United States to the war between Pakistan and India, and to the Chinese border demands upon India, has been one of admirable restraint. President Johnson and his foreign policy advisers are to be commended for the finesse and sophistication they have shown in dealing with this grave crisis in the Asian subcontinent.

In this morning's edition of the Washington Post, Mr. Joseph Kraft contributes a brilliant article, entitled "Peacemaking in Asia," in which he gives the Johnson administration the credit due it for the initial steps taken thus far in dealing with the delicate diplomatic problems posed by this unfortunate war.

I ask unanimous consent that the Kraft column be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

PEACEMAKING IN ASIA

(By Joseph Kraft)

Victory to la Hitler and Napoleon, victory that means seized capitals and subdued countries, is not in the cards in the Indian subcontinent. Given the terrain, the size of the forces, and the state of the local art, the worst likely military trouble is intensified fighting ending in the kind of nonend that has characterized almost all frontier struggles in the postwar era.

But there is a serious diplomatic danger that could materialize within a month. It would be possible for Russia to emerge from the present troubles as the dominant diplomatic power in India. China could emerge as the dominant diplomatic power in Paki-

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stan. It is against that awful outcome that American diplomacy must be mobilized. So far it can be said that the administration has met the test with remarkable sophistication. It has shown a clear appreciation of what has been going on. It has scrupulously avoided panicky reactions and unilateral moves that could only make matters worse. It has even avoided that fatal combination that has been the hallmark of American diplomacy through the decades—the combination of force and unctuous rectitude.

On one side, the Indian side, of the quarrel, this country has for once resisted the temptation to indulge in an orgy of China-baiting. Unlike the Pakistanis, Indians, and Rumanians who have all been doing the kind of things that make the Chinese look 10 feet tall, the United States has been patient and moderate.

The strongest official statement about Chinese intervention made by the United States was a remark made last week by the Secretary of State after giving testimony to the Congress. Because it produced banner headlines of an American warning to Peking, the statement is worth reproducing in full.

Mr. Ruak was asked about charges that Communist China has been "egging on" the fight on the subcontinent. In a reply of studied mildness, he said: "I think there are those who feel that China is trying to fish in troubled waters here. Our own advice to Peking would be not to do that and to stay out of it and give the Security Council of the United Nations a chance to settle this matter."

On the other side of the quarrel, the Pakistani side, this country has resisted the itch to make moral judgments about the Kashmir issue. Instead of trying, as the Pakistanis put it, to solve the problem rather than the symptoms, Washington has kept its righteousness under firm control. The closest this country has come to a pronouncement on Kashmir was again the comment made by the Secretary of State after testimony on the Hill last week.

His words were remarkable for measured care. And once again, because they were widely misinterpreted, they are worth citing.

Mr. Ruak was asked about a plebiscite that would achieve self-determination on Kashmir. He said: "We have expressed our views on that subject over the years. That is part of a general problem of solution of outstanding issues between India and Pakistan. We believe that these matters should be taken up and resolved by peaceful means. We do not believe they should be resolved by force."

With this country keeping its tone measured, the Russians and Chinese, far from scoring great gains as the hawk hawks would assert, have over reached themselves. The Chinese, fearful that a settlement of sorts might be in the works, issued their ultimatum in the evident hope of preventing Pakistan from coming to terms. Lacking the capacity for truly serious action on the ground, they have been obliged to extend the ultimatum. It is now not easy to see how they will emerge without a simultaneous loss of prestige, and a new confirmation of their role as chief international troublemaker.

For their part, the Russians, after issuing the kind of warnings bound to incite Peking, have pulled the grandstand play of calling for a meeting of Indian and Pakistani representatives in Moscow. If it comes off at all, which is extremely doubtful, it is hard to see how a Moscow meeting can yield concrete results. Far from making the most of an opportunity, the Russians seem merely to be underlining their own limitations. They may end up with egg all over their face.

The lesson here is not simply Milton's homily that "they also serve who only stand and wait"; that, after all, was an ode to blindness. The true lesson, the lesson for

those who would see in the dark is that in the face of the Chinese, the helmsman reaction is almost always the wrong reaction. The right policy is to turn to account against the Chinese the mischievous political swamps that fringe the Asian heartland. And nowhere is that more true than in that other Asian trouble spot that we all know in our bones is dimly related to the crisis in the subcontinent—Vietnam.

SPECIAL INDEMNITY INSURANCE FOR MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES SERVING IN COMBAT ZONES

The PRESIDENT pro tempore laid before the Senate the amendment of the House of Representatives to the bill (S. 2127) to amend title 38, United States Code, in order to provide special indemnity insurance for members of the Armed Forces serving in combat zones, and for other purposes, which was to strike out all after the enacting clause and insert:

That (a) chapter 19 of title 38, United States Code, is amended by redesignating "Subchapter III—General" thereof as "Subchapter IV—General" and by inserting immediately after subchapter II thereof the following new subchapter III:

"SUBCHAPTER III—SERVICEMEN'S GROUP LIFE INSURANCE

"§ 765. Definitions

"For the purpose of this subchapter—

"(1) The term 'active duty' means full-time duty as a commissioned or warrant officer, or as an enlisted member of a uniformed service under a call or order to duty that does not specify a period of thirty days or less.

"(2) The term 'member' means a person on active duty in the uniformed services in a commissioned, warrant, or enlisted rank or grade.

"(3) The term 'uniformed services' means the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, Public Health Service, and Environmental Science Services Administration,

"§ 766. Eligible insurance companies

"(a) The Administrator is authorized, without regard to section 3709 of the Revised Statutes, as amended (41 U.S.C. 5), to purchase from one or more life insurance companies a policy or policies of group life insurance to provide the benefits specified in this subchapter. Each such life insurance company must (1) be licensed to issue life insurance in each of the fifty States of the United States and in the District of Columbia, and (2) as of the most recent December 31 for which information is available to the Administrator, have in effect at least 1 per centum of the total amount of group life insurance which all life insurance companies have in effect in the United States.

"(b) The life insurance company or companies issuing such policy or policies shall establish an administrative office at a place and under a name designated by the Administrator.

"(c) The Administrator shall arrange with the life insurance company or companies issuing any policy or policies under this subchapter to reinsure, under conditions approved by him, portions of the total amount of insurance under such policy or policies with such other life insurance companies (which meet qualifying criteria set forth by the Administrator) as may elect to participate in such reinsurance.

"(d) The Administrator may at any time discontinue any policy or policies which he has purchased from any insurance company under this subchapter.

"§ 767. Reason insured: amount

"(a) Any policy of insurance purchased by the Administrator under section 766 of this title shall automatically insure any member of the uniformed services on active duty against death in the amount of \$10,000 from the first day of such duty, or from the date certified by the Administrator to the Secretary concerned as the date Servicemen's Group Life Insurance under this subchapter takes effect, whichever date is the later date, unless such member elects in writing (1) not to be insured under this subchapter, or (2) to be insured in the amount of \$5,000.

"(b) If any member elects not to be insured under this subchapter or to be insured in the amount of \$5,000, he may thereafter be insured under this subchapter or insured in the amount of \$10,000 under this subchapter, as the case may be, upon written application, proof of good health, and compliance with such other terms and conditions as may be prescribed by the Administrator.

"§ 768. Termination of coverage; conversion

"Each policy purchased under this subchapter shall contain a provision, in terms approved by the Administrator, to the effect that any insurance thereunder on any member of the uniformed services shall cease (except in the case of members absent without leave) one hundred and twenty days after his separation or release from active duty, and that during the period such insurance is in force the insured upon request to the administrative office established under subsection 768(b) of this title shall be furnished a list of life insurance companies participating in the program established under this subchapter and upon written application (within such period) to the participating company selected by the insured and payment of the required premiums be granted insurance without a medical examination on a plan then currently written by such company which does not provide for the payment of any sum less than the face value thereof or for the payment of an additional amount as premiums if the insured engages in the military service of the United States, to replace the Servicemen's Group Life Insurance in effect on the insured's life under this subchapter. In addition to life insurance companies participating in the program established under this subchapter, such list shall include additional life insurance companies (not so participating) which meet qualifying criteria, terms, and conditions established by the Administrator and agree to sell insurance to members and former members in accordance with the provisions of the preceding sentence. In the case of any member who is absent without leave for a period of more than thirty-one days, insurance under this subchapter shall cease as of the date such absence commenced. Any such member so absent without leave, upon return to duty, may again be insured under this subchapter, but only if he complies with the requirements set forth in section 767(b) of this section.

"§ 769. Deductions; payment; investment; expenses

"(a) During any period in which a member is insured under a policy of insurance purchased by the Administrator under section 766 of this title, there shall be deducted each month from his basic or other pay until separation or release from active duty an amount determined by the Administrator (which shall be the same for all such members) as the share of the cost attributable to insuring such member under such policy, less any cost traceable to the extra hazard of active duty in the uniformed service. Any amount not deducted from the basic

When these young men saw their names and pictures printed in a newspaper 5,000 miles away in Monterey Park, they realized perhaps for the first time, that Americans are deeply interested in them as persons. I wish to commend and thank the progress for generating this good will between peoples and for reciprocating toward the Brazilian people of Joao Pessoa the same hospitality which has been extended by the local Brazilian newspapers toward the Americans.

WHY AID BRAZIL?

Underlying my previous reports and, indeed our economic mission to Brazil, is a penetrating question: Why should the American taxpayer send funds to stimulate economic growth in this distant land? My longtime friend and Congressman, George Brown, has consistently supported this idea. The late President Kennedy developed the broad outline of this aid program in his prelection book, "Strategy for Peace." President Johnson's administration has continued and extended the plan. Why?

I found at least some of the answers in a glass of Brazilian "cachaca" (sugarcane rum.) It happened this way. One of northeast Brazil's outstanding lawyer-economists is Celso Leite. Celso is a busy man. Mornings he sits as judge of one of Paraiba's administrative courts. Afternoons he is director of the University's Institute of Social and Economic Research, and in his spare time he writes articles about Brazil's economy, advises the Bank of Northeast Brazil, and serves as consultant to many governmental agencies. Naturally, an action man such as Celso is hard to see.

One Sunday afternoon, Celso's charming wife had just served an exciting Brazilian dinner and Celso retreated to a hammock on the porch, relaxing with a glass of "cachaca" in hand. I decided to exploit the opportunity to interview him. Here are my questions and Celso's answers:

LOW INCOME

Question. Why is northeast Brazil frequently described as a depressed area?

Answer. "Simply because the per-capita income in terms of U.S. dollars is about \$100 per year—30 cents per day per person. By way of comparison, Americans in your depressed Appalachia average more than 10 times that income."

Question. Why are incomes in northeast Brazil so low?

Answer. "There are several reasons. First, the interior region 50 miles inland from the coastal rainbelt is dry, barren, and drought afflicted. Something like your Feather River project is the only long-run solution to that problem. Second, local investment capital has tended to migrate to Recife, Sao Paulo, and Rio. We need to develop new industries in Paraiba and then we will have more jobs which will raise the income level."

Question. Is that where the U.S. aid program comes in?

Answer. "Certamente. American taxpayers pay one-half of the cost of feasibility studies aimed at starting new industries. Northeast Brazilian investors acting on this information, instead of south in Rio, where things are prosperous. The new factories may also get favorable loans from the Brazilian banks which have access to U.S. Inter-American bank credit."

NEED HELP

Question. What do you personally think of the U.S. aid?

Answer. "We need help, and U.S. aid through the Alliance for Progress is the best kind of international help I've seen yet, because it is not simply a handout. We match U.S. funds for economic development so that it is a cooperative effort. More important, the Alliance for Progress is not based upon the principle of extracting diplomatic

concessions in exchange for economic assistance. We have insisted upon this policy beginning with the administration of President Vargas in the early forties."

Question. What, in your opinion, would Brazil do if U.S. aid was discontinued?

Answer. "Brazil cannot wait a half-century to develop its northeast sector economically and industrially. We must have technical assistance and long-term credit. As a constitutional republic we naturally look to the United States for this help. But if U.S. aid is discontinued, there is no doubt in my mind we would look to other large nations of the world for assistance and this would include Soviet Russia. I believe the great majority of Brazilians do not want Soviet help because it would probably involve commitments inconsistent with our liberties."

I had finished my interview and Celso finished his "cachaca." I think you will find both stimulating.

Cordially,

GORDON SEVERANCE.

If We Don't Make a Stand Somewhere

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. JACK BROOKS

OF TEXAS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, September 20, 1965

Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Speaker, on September 1, 1965, 1st Lt. Carl Mangold, U.S. Army, was killed in action in Vietnam when the helicopter he was flying was hit by Communist fire and exploded in the air. Carl Mangold, a young Texan from Medina Valley, left a widow, Frann, two infant daughters, Shelley, age 3, and Jill, 1½, and a baby, Christopher, who is only 5 months old.

Before this 25-year-old Texan gave his life heroically in the service of our country he had expressed his thoughts and feelings about the importance of what he was doing in Vietnam in a letter to his wife.

Excerpts from these letters appeared September 15, in the Medina Valley & County News Bulletin, a newspaper published in Castroville, Tex. His words, which are accompanied by an account of his funeral, express in plain yet eloquent fashion his devotion to duty and his understanding of our country's purpose.

The article reads as follows:

"If We Don't Make a Stand Somewhere—"

"Take a good look at this picture and place yourself in this woman's shoes. This should, alone, explain exactly what I am doing here. This is something that has never happened in America, except for the Civil War; but remember it can if we don't make a stand somewhere. This could very well be Castroville, Tex., instead of Le My, Vietnam."

So wrote 1st Lt. Carl Mangold shortly before he was shot down and killed while piloting an Army copter in Vietnam. The picture to which he refers in the letter to his wife, Frann, is of a Vietnamese mother and her infant son hiding in bushes to escape fighting as U.S. Marines clear the area of Vietcong. The letter continues:

"This is not an unusual picture. I see things like this daily. I have med-evacuated children no older than Shelley and Jill (the Mangolds' children) who were burned over 60 percent of their body after the Vietcong had attacked their village."

He ends the letter: "I am proud to be able to help these people as best I can and I am extremely thankful that I am an American."

In another letter to Frann:

"I have learned to watch people die who are innocent. I have seen the bodies of dead soldiers, badly disfigured. I have watched some good friends die, being totally unable to help, but, at the same time, I have proven to my fellow soldiers and myself that I am no coward."

"I am willing to do whatever is necessary to save lives. I have been under heavy fire, the ship (copter) hit numerous times, but have always had the courage to carry on. I think that the 1st Article in the Code of Conduct states exactly how I feel about being a soldier: 'I am an American fighting man, I serve in the forces which guard my country and my way of life. I am prepared to give my life in its defense.'"

In one of his last letters:

"If I must die in my tour over here, believe me, I will always be proud to say that, 'I am an American fighting man,' and I would want you to feel the same way. After all, love of God, country, and family are all tightly woven, and if a man falls in any, he is only partially a man. This may sound to some people like a lot of bull, but to me it all means so very much."

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Failure in Southeast Asia?

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. J. ARTHUR YOUNGER

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, September 20, 1965

Mr. YOUNGER. Mr. Speaker, it is always interesting to get first-hand information from the young people returning from their 2-year assignments in the Peace Corps.

Recently, Greg Stikes, from Burlingame, Calif., in our congressional district—returned home after an assignment in Indonesia and Thailand. He gave an interview which was published in the Burlingame Advance Star on September 15, and which follows:

FAILURE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA?—"THE PEACE CORPS DOESN'T SEEM TO BE THE ANSWER"

(By Bruce Lee)

A young Burlingame Peace Corps man told an unpleasant story of U.S. failure and frustration in the Far East upon his return Monday from 2 years of duty in Indonesia and Thailand.

Gregory W. Stikes, 25, of 772 Walnut Avenue, former Burlingame High School star athlete, left little doubt that the Peace Corps has proven ineffectual in winning political friendship in the Far East.

"I've talked to Corps men stationed from Afghanistan to Thailand," Greg said, "and the general opinion is the same—we're not doing enough to warrant our being there. It's the same story of frustration everywhere the Corps men have had to lower their goals, and after they've gone their work is soon forgotten."

"I feel very strongly about stopping the advance of communism. But, certainly in Indonesia and most of the rest of the Far East, the Peace Corps doesn't seem to be the answer."

"The United States spent \$800 million in Indonesia. But the Corps was kicked out by President Sukarno. And Indonesia is going

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Communist. The obvious conclusion is that the taxpayers didn't get their money's worth and that the Peace Corps is clearly not a workable method there to stop communism."

Stikes, an all-peninsula football quarterback at Burlingame High School and a half-back at University of Pacific, joined the Corps on October 1, 1964, following graduation from college.

After 3 months of training in Hilo, Hawaii, Greg was sent to Djakarta and then to the island of Ambolna in Indonesia.

"My assignment was to develop an athletic program," Stikes said. "President Sukarno asked us to upgrade the level of sports because the Indonesian islands are so spread and diversified it was felt that pride in athletic achievement would help consolidate and unify the nation.

"Specifically, I was asked to develop a basketball team that could beat a Chinese team. At least, the Corps succeeded there. We did build a basketball team that could beat the Chinese.

"Otherwise, the athletic program was pretty much a failure. We had no cooperation from the Indonesian Government, and we didn't do anything in sports the people there couldn't have done for themselves.

"Frankly, the Indonesians simply weren't very interested. They failed to understand why we even were there. One fellow asked us, 'Why did the United States send people all this way just to coach a sports team?'

"The same apathy toward the Corps applied in other areas. I taught—or tried to teach—in the University of Ambolna, too. I had a class in English conversation and one in history—I majored in history at University of Pacific.

"The English conversation class was supposed to meet 20 times. Students showed up for only 5 of the 20 meetings. How many students? Nine. They simply didn't care.

"Seldom was there enough work—meaningful work—for Peace Corps men to do. So we sat around and brooded and developed ulcers and got sick. Bart Eaton (of Red Bluff), who was with me at Ambolna to develop the athletic program, couldn't adapt to the rice and fish diet. Bart developed malnutrition. He also had malaria, dysentery, cholera and hepatitis. I was malnourished myself.

"There were just the two of us in Ambolna and 45 Corps men in all of Indonesia. All of us were regarded as spies. We became the objects of constant Communist aggression and harassment. Eventually, as everyone knows, President Sukarno ordered us out of the nation.

"I honestly think we should have gone before we did. The Peace Corps was being kicked in the teeth. The friends we made—who were pro-West before we arrived anyway—feared reprisals if seen in our company. The taxpayers were spending \$9,500 to keep each of us in Indonesia. Why stay to keep on getting kicked in the teeth?"

It took 5 weeks for Stikes to be transported the 1,500 miles from Ambolna to Djakarta. Then he was sent to Yala in southern Thailand where he remained for 2 months.

"There was some greater progress in Thailand, but it still was pretty much the same story—not enough work, not enough results." Stikes terminated his Peace Corps membership while in Thailand.

"Would I do it all over again, knowing what I do now? You bet. It was a wonderful personal experience. I met some fine people and had my eyes opened about the world and the way our Government operates.

"But would I do it solely for the sake of getting a job done? No. Because we didn't. Except the Indonesians do play better basketball now than they ever did."

Marshall Field: Publisher, Civic Leader, and Humanitarian

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. FRANK ANNUNZIO

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, September 20, 1965

Mr. ANNUNZIO. Mr. Speaker, I am saddened at the sudden death of Marshall Field, the distinguished editor and publisher of the Chicago Sun-Times and the Chicago Daily News, who was taken from us on September 18 at the age of 49.

Marshall Field was a man of intellect and integrity, and an outstanding civic leader with a keen insight into the needs of Chicagoans and the city of Chicago. Many of the changes he advocated to improve the city, such as judicial reform, neighborhood renewal, the construction of a civic center, the building of a Chicago campus for the University of Illinois, and countless other projects, have been accomplished today mainly through his dedicated efforts.

I knew his father and had the privilege of serving with him on several fundraising committees for our beloved city of Chicago. I served with him, representing the old CIO, on a fundraising committee in the early days of the establishment of Roosevelt University.

Gov. Otto Kerner; Mayor Richard Daley; Senator EVERETT DIRKSEN; Senator PAUL DOUGLAS; Dr. George W. Beadle, president of the University of Chicago; Fairfax M. Cone, chairman of the board of trustees for the University of Chicago; Dr. Lowell T. Coggeshall, vice president of the University of Chicago; and scores of other political and civic leaders have joined in paying tribute to the great humanitarian, Marshall Field, for his work in the community and in the public interest.

Marshall Field shall be missed by thousands upon thousands of Chicagoans, but the work he began in their interest shall continue under plans he had formulated for stronger support for the universities, hospitals, and museums in the Chicago area.

I insert into the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD an editorial about Marshall Field which appeared in the Chicago Sun-Times today. The editorial follows:

MARSHALL FIELD, 1916-65

Marshall Field was deeply dedicated to Chicago. He had ambitious plans for this city which his great-grandfather had helped rebuild after the great fire of 1871. His most important goal was the development of two strong and independent newspapers as a base from which to work for a better community and a better life for all Chicagoans.

His sudden death at the age of 49 comes as a sad and shocking loss not only to his newspaper associates but to other citizens who knew him well through his work on many civic and business enterprises. All were inspired by his vision of a better city and a better American society.

The loss the staffs of the newspapers feel is very much a personal one. For Marshall Field was more than a publisher; he was a friend. Often he was to be found in the newsroom in shirtsleeves and suspenders, talking on a first-name basis with members of the staff.

Although an heir to a great fortune and trained in law, Mr. Field chose to be a newspaperman and so described himself. He was proud of the designation. He brought a keen mind and a natural bent toward leadership in the newspaper field. He worked hard to learn the business, showing the same zest and energy he had shown earlier as president of his law school graduating class and as a combat naval officer in World War II.

Son of the founder of the Chicago Sun, which was merged with the Chicago Times in 1948, Mr. Field succeeded his father as editor and publisher of this newspaper October 1, 1950. He carried on in the philosophy of the newspaper's founder expressed in the elder Field's book, "Freedom Is More Than a Word":

"The spirit of man will not become satisfied so long as there exists any fellow being in want, any disease uncured, any injustice unquestioned, or any pool of darkness unlit by the lamp of knowledge."

Mr. Field's daily decisions as editor and publisher showed a keen insight into the moral responsibilities and the business realities of 20th century journalism.

Mr. Field believed strongly in the need for a strong two-party political system. He encouraged progressive, as distinguished from radical, elements in both parties. He believed the business of politics needed new blood and new ideas.

He was one of the first American newspaper publishers to call for the nomination of Dwight D. Eisenhower for the Presidency in 1952. Neither the Sun nor the Times previously had supported a Republican for President. The decision was in tune with our times as the election returns showed. So was his decision last year to support President Johnson over Senator Barry Goldwater.

On occasion Mr. Field wrote his own editorials. In 1958 he presented a platform for Chicago that was welcomed and praised by business, civic, and political leaders. It detailed improvements needed here in transportation, education, race relations, police protection, neighborhood renewal and many other areas.

Some of the changes he advocated then have come about. Judicial reform has been carried out. The plan for a Fort Dearborn governmental and commercial structure was altered and Chicago now has the civic center. The University of Illinois Chicago campus is being built. Neighborhood renewal is well underway. Chicago has yet to meet the problem of downtown traffic and to replace the Loop L structure with a subway as Mr. Field advocated 8 years ago.

The final words of his platform apply as well today as then:

"With faith in a kindly providence and confidence in ourselves, we should be able not only to build a fabulous Metropolitan Chicago but contribute much to the building of a better world.

"This is our real destiny and we are honor-bound to fulfill it."

The vigor Mr. Field directed toward the publishing of the Sun-Times and the Daily News was also shown in his contributions to other Field Enterprise companies, World Book Encyclopedia, Childcraft, and the newly formed Field Communications Corp.

These are all enterprises concerned with the communications field. Mr. Field's greatest legacy to Chicago is the organization that will carry on this work so vital to a free